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ARTICLES
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER:
THE Dames & Moore CASE*
DAVID F. FORTE**
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1953, EDWARD S. CORWIN WROTE AN ARTICLE CRITICAL OF THE way the
Supreme Court had handled President Truman's seizure of the steel
mills during the Korean War.1 He titled the piece, The Steel Seizure
Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw.2 Subsequent judicial history has
demonstrated that his judgment of the case was unnecessarily harsh,
particularly his view that "Justice Jackson's rather desultory opinion
contains little that is of direct pertinence to the constitutional issue."3
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Dames & Moore v. Regan.4 Ac-
cording to the modest view of the majority opinion, the Dames & Moore
case is not even a brick, with or without straw. As Justice Rehnquist
stated for the Court: "We attempt to lay down no general 'guide-lines'...
and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary
to the decision of the case." 5
A second look, however, reveals that in Dames & Moore, the Supreme
Court did more than resolve some of the sticky legalities that were part
of a serious foreign policy crisis. It also moved the country one step for-
ward towards a strengthened constitutional structuring of the foreign
affairs power.
II. LAW AND DIPLOMACY
Dames & Moore v. Regan was the test vehicle through which the
Supreme Court scrutinized the constitutionality of the settlement with
* This Article grew out of a paper presented to a meeting of the Western
Political Science Association in San Diego on March 25, 1982. I am indebted to a
number of colleagues for their encouragement and advice: Professor Roger
Rieber of the University of Utah, and Professors Joel Finer, Stephen Steinglass
and Janice Toran of the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. A.B., Harvard; M.A., University of Manchester; Ph.D., University of
Toronto; J.D., Columbia University School of Law.
' He was commenting on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
2 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953).
3 Id at 63.
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Id. at 661.
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Iran which permitted the release of the American hostages held by that
government. On November 4, 1979, a large number of Iranians invaded
the American embassy in Teheran. They took control of the entire em-
bassy compound and held hostage all diplomatic and other captured per-
sonnel. Soon thereafter, the Iranian government signaled its approval of
the capture and accepted responsibility for the continued detention of
the Americans.
On November 14, 1979, asserting authority under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergen-
cies Act,7 President Carter declared a national emergency and blocked
the transfer of all assets of the Iranian government located within the
jurisdiction of the United States.8
Pursuant to the executive order, the Secretary of the Treasury issued
enforcing regulations in November and December of 1979 and April
1980.' In addition to defining those assets subject to the blocking order,
the regulations voided any existing attachments or judgments on any
Iranian assets covered by the blocking order." The regulations,
however, did allow for the initiation of judicial proceedings including
pre-judgment attachments against Iran in United States courts, but
with the proviso that no final decree or judgment could be entered."
Furthermore, even those non-final attachments and proceedings were
subject to change or revocation at any time."
Over one year later, on January 20, 1981, the captive Americans were
released according to the terms of an agreement between the United
States and Iran as mediated by Algeria. 3 The terms of the agreement
called for:
a) the establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
to arbitrate by "final and binding" judgment any claim not
settled within six months of the agreement;
6 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978).
7 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-1622 (1976). President Carter also cited 3 U.S.C. §
301 as authority to act.
I Exec. Order No. 12,170, 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(Supp. III 1979).
31 C.F.R. § 535 (1981).
Id. § 535.203(e).
" Id. § 535.504.
12 Id. § 535.805.
'8 The agreement actually contained a Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and a Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Government of Algeria Concerning the Set-
tlement of Claims by the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047, at 1, 3 (1981).
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b) the lifting of all attachments of Iranian property in United
States courts;
c) the suspension of all claims by American nationals or cor-
porations against Iran and its state enterprises in courts in
the United States;
d) the payment by Iran of $3.7 billion of its blocked assets to
satisfy immediately part of its bank debt while placing $1.4
billion of blocked assets in escrow to pay the negotiated set-
tlements of the remaining bank debt;
e) the placing of $1 billion with the newly established Claims
Tribunal to satisfy its judgments. If the fund fell below $500
million, Iran would replenish it until all judgments were
paid;
f) the ending of United States trade sanctions against Iran;
g) the withdrawal of all United States claims before the Inter-
national Court of Justice;
h) the transfer to Iran of all Iranian assets not needed for
escrow; and
i) the freezing of any assets of the late Shah and his family
within the United States pending any suit by the Iranian
government to recover them.
President Carter and later President Reagan issued a number of ex-
ecutive orders effectuating the provisions of the agreement. 4 The
orders and regulations issued thereunder cancelled all rights obtained
under the previously issued licenses, '1 5 nullified all interests in the Iran-
ian assets that occurred after the blocking orders," and ordered banks
to transfer Iranian assets in accordance with the agreement.'
In addition to ratifying the executive orders of President Carter,
President Reagan suspended all claims against Iran in United States
courts that were capable of being brought before the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal.' 8 His order declared that "[d]uring the period of this
suspension, all such claims shall have no legal effect in any action now
pending in any court in the United States .... .. 9 A determination
by the Iran-United States Tribunal of the merits of any particular claim
is to be final,' although a claimant may revive his claim in a United
" Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,284, 12,294, 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1981), reprinted in
50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp. 1982).
31 C.F.R. § 535.218(a) (1981).
0 Id § 535.218(b). In addition, the regulations prohibited all claims against
Iran in connection with the detention of the hostages. Id § 535.216.
" Id. § 535.210-.212.
i8 Id § 535.222(a).
19 Id
-' Id § 535.222(f).
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States court if the Tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction over that
claim."
Shortly after President Carter had blocked Iranian assets and issued
the revocable licenses allowing suits against Iran, Dames & Moore as
assignee of its wholly-owned Iranian subsidiary, brought suit in United
States District Court against Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran, and some Iranian banks. Dames & Moore asserted that the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran owed it nearly $3.5 million plus interest for
services provided by its subsidiary. The district court attached property
of the defendants as security for a possible judgment.22
Dames & Moore moved for summary judgment after President Carter
had issued his executive orders enforcing the agreement with Iran. The
motion was granted, but the district court stayed execution of the judg-
ment pending appeal and vacated all pre-judgment attachments as
directed by the executive orders and regulations." Shortly thereafter,
President Reagan issued his executive order suspending all claims
against Iran and its subsidiary agencies. The effect of the suspension
was to remove the Dames & Moore suit from United States court juris-
diction.
Because the executive orders of two Presidents were the only bar-
riers to Dames & Moore executing its judgment, the claimant filed for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the government and Secretary
of the Treasury Regan."' Dames & Moore asserted that the presidential
actions had no constitutional warrant and that they invaded the com-
pany's constitutional rights in pursuing its suits against Iran and the
Atomic Energy Organization. The district court denied the motion, but
issued an injunction forbidding the United States from transferring any
Iranian property out of the country that was connected with Dames &
Moore's claim." Although Dames & Moore had lodged an appeal with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, it also had
petitioned for a writ of certiorari before judgment from the Supreme
Court. The writ was granted," briefing and argument were expedited
and the Supreme Court issued its decision on July 2, 1981.
The petitioner did not assert that the original orders blocking the
transfer of Iranian assets were invalid. Indeed, petitioner was able to at-
tach that property since the property had been ordered to remain in the
United States, and because the license to do so was granted by the ex-
ecutive orders and Treasury regulations subsequent to the freeze. Peti-
tioner had no attachments on the property before the freeze had been
2'1 Id. § 535.222(e).
453 U.S. at 664 n.4.
Id § at 666.
24Id
Id. at 667.
452 U.S. 932 (1981).
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ordered. The facts thus obviated facing one issue at the outset: whether
the President's order cancelling attachments that had been entered
before the freeze violated the taking clause or the due process clause.27
The two major issues which the Supreme Court faced were 1) whether
President Carter was acting within the limits of the Constitution when
he ordered the frozen Iranian property out of the country, and more
significantly, 2) whether President Reagan possessed constitutional
authority to suspend all claims against Iran then pending in courts
throughout the United States.
III. TRANSFER OF ASSETS
The petitioner mounted its first attack on President Carter's order to
transfer the frozen property after the agreement with Iran, but the
Supreme Court found ample authority for the President in the IEEPA.
Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by quoting from two of the most
famous Supreme Court opinions dealing with the presidential foreign af-
fairs power: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.28 and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.' In the former case, Justice
Sutherland in dictum gave the President extremely wide latitude in
foreign affairs, terming it "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of foreign relations." In the Youngstown case, Justice Rehn-
quist pointed to Justice Jackson's now highly regarded formula viz.,
that the President's power in foreign affairs is at its greatest when he
"acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress,"3
and at its weakest "when the President takes measures incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress."3 2 In the latter instance,
the President's actions are valid "only in disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject."'
Both Justice Jackson and Justice Rehnquist admit that the most dif-
ficult problem arises when the President acts without the explicit ap-
21 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1981). In his separate opinion in Dames & Moore,
Justice Powell suggested that such attachments are indeed a species of property
protectable under the taking clause of the fifth amendment. 453 U.S. at 690 n.1
(Powell, J., concurring and dissenting in part). One commentator has suggested
that even if there is some protectable property interest in pre-judgment at-
tachments, it would likely apply only to those assets that were not immune under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-1611 (1976). Comment by Alan Swan, Transcript of a Conference on The Set-
tlement with Iran, 13 LAw. AM. 1, 72 (1981).
28 299 U.S. 304 (1926).
29 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
299 U.S. at 319-20.
, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 637.
Id. at 638-39.
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proval or disapproval of Congress. In such a case, the Court must ex-
amine whether the circumstances of the case give any clue as to
whether the silence of the legislature stems from tacit approval or tacit
disapproval.3 4 In Justice Jackson's three categories of congressional
authorization, congressional silence, or congressional prohibition, the
hardest case could arise when silence occurred because of a conflict of
views within the legislative branch, or because the legislative branch
had never seriously considered the issue.
In the Dames & Moore case, Justice Rehnquist explicitly favored the
use of Justice Jackson's formula over Justice Sutherland's. As such, this
case represents a somewhat different emphasis for Justice Rehnquist,
for previously he had relied more on Justice Sutherland's conception of
the inherent power of the Presidency in dealing with foreign affairs. In
Goldwater v. Carter,35 for example, Justice Rehnquist rejected Youngs-
town as the appropriate precedent in favor of Curtiss-Wright. He opined
that the dispute between Congress and the President over the power to
denounce treaties involved an issue whose effect was "entirely external
to the United States, and [falls] within the category of foreign affairs."'
Earlier, in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,7 speak-
ing for a plurality, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the President had
complete power to direct a court not to apply the Act of State doctrine
in any case in which it was raised. Once again, he cited Curtiss-Wright
as authority. Similarly, in dissenting in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,38 he spoke of the necessity of maintaining confiden-
tiality in the executive branch, particularly "in the area of foreign af-
fairs and international relations," citing Curtiss-Wright.9
Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dames & Moore embraces
the Jackson formula, he does not entirely cast himself off from Curtiss-
Wright. First he notes pointedly that both parties as well as the lower
courts argued their respective opinions on the basis of Jackson's opinion
in Youngstown. ° Second, he quoted Justice Jackson as admitting that
the tripartite analysis was "a somewhat over-simplified grouping."'41
Finally as noted above, Justice Rehnquist insisted that this case did not
"attempt to lay down [any] general 'guide-lines' covering other situa-
453 U.S. at 668-69.
444 U.S. 966 (1979).
Id at 1005 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1926)).
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
433 U.S. 425 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551 n.6.
40 453 U.S. at 668.
" Id. at 669 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952)).
[Vol. 31:43
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tions not involved here."42 As will be demonstrated later, Justice Rehn-
quist is moving towards a structure in which both Youngstown and
Curtiss-Wright have a place.
Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist found that President Carter's right to
nullify the earlier attachments and transfer Iranian funds fit squarely in
Justice Jackson's first category, i e., the President was acting pursuant
to an explicit act of Congress. 3 The IEEPA, as a partial revision of the
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA)," authorizes the President not
only to "prohibit" the "transfer" of "any property" of the foreign coun-
try, following the declaration of a national emergency, but also permits
the President to "direct and compel" or "void" any such transfer, and to
"void" the exercise of "any right, power or privilege with respect to...
any property in which any foreign country .. .has any interest. . ...15
The Court held that the plain meaning of the statute authorized the
President to void any rights derived from the attachment of Iranian
property after the freeze. Indeed the plain meaning would cover the
voiding of attachments that took place before the freeze was instituted."
Beyond the plain meaning of the IEEPA, Justice Rehnquist found
that the purpose of the statute was to give the President a "bargaining
chip" in his dealings with a hostile country." As such, the President was
operating in the area of international negotiations, clearly an article II
power. If Dames & Moore had prevailed, the result would remove a tool
that Congress had decided the President should have in his role as chief
negotiator.
Since the President's action was justified as a proper exercise of his
and Congress foreign affairs power, the only possible limitations are in
the due process or taking clauses. Justice Rehnquist dismissed the claim
of a procedural due process violation by noting that the claimant was on
notice because the very license that allowed it to attach the property
was announced as revocable.48 Moreover, the same provision of revoca-
42 Id. at 661.
43 453 U.S. at 674.
" 50 U.S.C. app §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
' The text of 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978) mandates that:
[The President may] investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
48 Apparently the TWEA, from which this section of the IEEPA derives, was
utilized in such a manner for many decades. Transcript of a Conference on The
Settlement with Iran, 13 LAw. AM. 1, 86 (1981).
'" 453 U.S. at 673.
8 Id
1982]
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bility effectively prevented the claimant from gaining any permanent in-
terest in the attached property. Dames & Moore, therefore, did not gain
any property interest that qualified under the taking clause. 9
IV. SUSPENSION OF CLAIMS
The major issue which the Court had to face was the validity of Presi-
dent Reagan's executive order suspending all claims against the Iranian
government in American courts and allowing such claims to be adjudi-
cated only before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
The government claimed that the President possessed statutory au-
thority to suspend claims under the IEEPA and the "Hostage Act."5 In
addition, the government asserted that the President also had inherent
power under his foreign relations power. Justice Rehnquist rejected the
argument that either the IEEPA or the Hostage Act gave specific
presidential authority to suspend the claims. The IEEPA dealt only
with interests in property, not with the right to bring in personam
lawsuits, and the legislative history of the Hostage Act indicates that it
was designed to protect naturalized Americans from being repatriated
against their will by their former states of nationality.5 1 In addition,
Justice Rehnquist denied that the President has "plenary power" to set-
tle claims.2
Justice Rehnquist, however, did not find that the President was act-
ing contrary to the will of Congress. It was not a case of Justice
Jackson's third category where the President's power must occupy the
field entirely to the exclusion of Congress. Rather, there was evidence
that Congress knowingly and affirmatively acquiesced in the President's
power to settle claims.
The two congressional statutes indicate a willingness on the part of
Congress to permit the President to use wide discretion in dealing with
an international emergency, particularly when it concerns a hostile
power. Thus, Justice Rehnquist grounds the President's general foreign
relations power in international emergencies not on an inherent right
per Curtiss-Wright, but on a knowing congressional acquiescence or even
an "invitation" for him to act as he sees fit.53 However, it is not enough
,9 Id. at 674 n.6. Justice Powell dissented from this part of the Court's
holding. He believed that in ordinary circumstances an attachment was a compen-
sable property right. Even a revocable license to attach defendant's property
may not necessarily void the property interest in the attachment itself. Compen-
sation may still be due. Id. at 690 n.1.
- 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1972).
51 453 U.S. at 675-76. The First Circuit had found that the President possessed
independent executive power to settle claims. Charles T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981).
453 U.S. at 688.
Id at 678.
[Vol. 31:43
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that there is a general congressional acquiescence. Even if there is a
general congressional permission, a second question must still be
answered. Although Congress has approved such general discretionary
action, is there any indication that Congress wanted to exclude the par-
ticular tactic of settling private claims against a foreign power? On the
contrary, states Justice Rehnquist, there has been a long-standing
presidential practice in settling such claims.5 Where Congress invites
general presidential discretion and where it has known and never ob-
jected to a particular assertion of presidential power, then there can be
no grounds for holding that the President either acted contrary to the
will of Congress or even in the absence of any indication of the will of
Congress. Thus, although there was no explicit or implicit congressional
authorization of the presidential action, there was an implicit congres-
sional approval of the presidential practice of settling claims.
5
This was not a case where congressional opinion was simply unknown
either because the issue was new to Congress or because Congress
never had an opportunity to consider the presidential action. In this
situation, there was an actual legislative moment of consideration where
Congress did have the occasion to direct presidential action and where
it chose not to. True, Congress did not explicitly disapprove an amend-
ment which would have limited the President's claims settlement
powers (as Congress had, in the Youngstown case, specifically disap-
proved an amendment granting the President the right to seize in-
dustries crippled by a labor strike). No such limiting bill or amendment
was even offered. But Congress did consider executive action in situa-
tions where the issue of the President's power to settle claims would
have been apposite. It chose not to limit the President. There was a
knowing acquiescence. On a spectrum of total and explicit congressional
approval at one end to total and explicit congressional disapproval at
the other end, the presidential action in this case is far closer to the
former pole.5"
In his reasoning, Justice Rehnquist did far more than give a tentative
approval of the Youngstown analysis over that of Curtiss-Wright. He re-
fined and developed the Youngstown approach into a better tool than it
has been in the past. Part of his accomplishment lay in his skillful
melding of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Youngstown with that of
Justice Jackson.5 7
In Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter suggested that historical prac-
tice could furnish the "gloss" on the President's inherent executive
, Justice Rehnquist traced the power back to 1799. Id n.8. See Hardwick,
The Iranian Hostage Agreement Cases: The Evolving Presidential Claims Set-
tlement Power, 35 Sw. L.J. 1055 (1982).
15 453 U.S. at 680.
5 Cf id at 669.
17 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952).
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power in conducting foreign relations. 8 Article II does not identify the
parameters of executive power in the way that article I sets the limits
to the legislative power. The executive power is presumed to have a
content, but for the most part it is undefined. The only other govern-
mental agency which possesses part of the foreign relations power and
which can be expected to defend itself against executive encroachment
is Congress. Congressional acquiescence therefore points to an accept-
ance of certain inherent executive powers.
Justice Rehnquist did not use Justice Frankfurter's analysis to find
an inherent executive power to settle claims against foreign states. In-
stead he combined it with Justice Jackson's tripartite structure. In doing
so, he helped to make actions that fall within Justice Jackson's second
category more practicable and definable. Heretofore, that category was
the widest and most unclear. In the context of an approval of general
presidential discretion, the long-standing acquiescence in a particular
practice subsumes it under the general congressional permission. The
thrust of Justice Rehnquist's opinion is not to disable Congress from-
acting on claims settlements altogether. That might be the result if long-
standing practice were used to give the President inherent and exclusive
power to settle claims. Rather, Justice Rehnquist's opinion anchors the
congressional role in foreign policy more securely by making practice to
be a permission of Congress and not a right of the President.
Although Justice Rehnquist does not go so far as to deny that the
President has an inherent power to deal with international emergencies,
he states a number of times how congressional acquiescence to the
President's claims settlement power by executive agreement is
"crucial" to the decision. 9
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities ....
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been deter-
mined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and
where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the Presi-
dent lacks the power to settle such claims.60
Justice Rehnquist insists, however, that congressional acquiescence to
the President's claims settlement power is enough: there is no require-
ment in the Constitution for an explicit congressional authorization. For
example, incident to his power of recognition of foreign governments
and states, the President may make use of an executive agreement to
settle claims free of the Senate's power of advice and consent. 1 In addi-
Id. at 610-11.
453 U.S. at 680.
Id at 688.
81 Id. at 682.
[Vol. 31:43
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
tion, Justice Rehnquist approvingly quoted Judge Hand who had stated
that "it would be unreasonable to circumscribe" the power to settle
claims merely as an incident to recognition.2 Thus, if the petitioner was
to prove its case, it had to show more than that the President acted
without an explicit and formal congressional authorization. The peti-
tioner must at least demonstrate that the evidence indicating an im-
plicit congressional approval of the power to settle claims was not truly
probative in this instance.
In fact, the petitioner did attempt to show that the President acted
either in the face of congressional silence or in the face of con-
gressional opposition. Dames & Moore argued that the past history of
presidential practice in settling claims was no longer legally relevant."
Its position was that until recent years, foreign states enjoyed absolute
immunity in American courts. Consequently, diplomacy was the only
mechanism legally available to redress wrongs committed by foreign
states against American citizens and American companies. In a sense,
the executive branch was the only governmental agency with the req-
uisite "jurisdiction" to settle these claims. However, since the publica-
tion of the Tate letter in 1952, the United States has adopted the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity whereby foreign sovereigns
became suable in American courts in terms of their commercial ac-
tivities. More particularly, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 specifically gave the federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate com-
mercial claims against foreign sovereigns. Therefore, both by the
development of restrictive immunity and by specific congressional
enactment, the President lost the power to settle claims on his own.
Justice Rehnquist dismissed the arguments by pointing to ten set-
tlements made by the President, without congressional objection, since
the Tate letter. 5 In addition, Congress implicitly approved continuing
presidential power in the field by enacting the International Claims Set-
tlement Act of 19496 and by devising formulas for distribution of pro-
ceeds from presidential settlements subsequent to 1949.7 Although
Justice Rehnquist did not mention it, even after the publication of the
Tate letter, the President retained and exercised the power of having
courts grant immunity to foreign sovereigns upon his suggestion.6 The
Tate letter, therefore, does not represent the revision of presidential
power to settle claims by the executive agreement.
Id. at 683 (quoting Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951)).
u Brief for Petitioners at 9-16.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
453 U.S. at 689 n.9.
22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
67 453 U.S. at 680-81.
See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
19821
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Dames & Moore also argued that the FSIA statutorily removed the
power from the President to settle claims against foreign states. Before
turning to this critical point, first consider how Justice Rehnquist would
resolve a direct conflict between the President and Congress, if one
arose, as Dames & Moore claimed.
V. TOWARDS A NEW STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Dames & Moore gives a further recognition of the place of Congress
in the exercise of the foreign affairs power. It must not be concluded,
however, that Justice Rehnquist intended to disable the President from
any independent exercise of his constitutional power in international af-
fairs. Quite the contrary. Indeed, if we relate Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion in Dames & Moore with his opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,9 we find
that he is beginning to develop a comprehensive structure of the foreign
relations power.
In Goldwater v. Carter, Justice Rehnquist argued that the political
question doctrine precluded the Court from deciding whether the Presi-
dent had the power to terminate treaties without the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. He based his position on the presence of two
necessary conditions. First, the effect of the President's action in ter-
minating the Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Republic of China"0 was
"entirely external to the United States."7 1 Second, the Constitution is
silent as to the method of terminating treaties. In fact there are a
number of mechanisms legally available to Congress to assert its will."
If Congress has constitutional authority to enter the field, and the Con-
stitution does not prescribe a single method of handling the problem,
then Congress is free to use its political resources including statutory
authority and its power over the purse to direct a solution. In Gold-
water v. Carter, Congress had plenty of independent methods of assert-
ing its will. The Court should not, in effect, take over Congress role.73
With this background, one can discern the constitutional structure in
the realm of foreign affairs that Justice Rehnquist has begun to develop.
This structure has the following skeletal form:
1) Where the presidential action has a domestic effect, the
Youngstown analysis as refined by Dames & Moore will be
applied.
a) The President acts with the explicit or implicit
69 444 U.S. 966 (1979).
70 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, United
States-China, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
71 444 U.S. at 1005 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
315 (1936)).
71 Id. at 1003 (citing the example of Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).
73 Id. at 1004 n.1. The assumption, of course, is that once Congress constitu-
tionally asserts its will through statute, the Court will enforce the domestic ef-
fets of the statute.
[Vol. 31:43
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authorization of Congress. The action is valid.
b) The President acts with congressional acquiescence of a
long-standing practice, and within that practice, there is-
no indication of congressional disapproval of the par-
ticular type of tactic the President is using. The action is
valid.
c) The President acts where there is an explicit or implicit
congressional prohibition. The action is invalid unless
Congress is disabled "from acting upon the subject" in
which case the presidential action is valid.
2) Where the effect of presidential action is entirely external
to the United States, the Curtiss-Wright analysis as
developed in Goldwater v. Carter will be employed.
a) The Constitution mandates a particular form the action
must take. The Court will hold the President to the
prescribed form.
(b) No particular method is required and Congress has a
number of political options at its disposal. The Court will
not decide the case as it is a political question.
Arguably, any action with an effect that is partly internal would be
analyzed under the first, or Youngstown part of the formula, because
the second part of Justice Rehnquist's structure is triggered only when
the effects of a presidential action are "entirely external" to the United
States. As most foreign affairs actions by the President possess both in-
ternal and external effects, it would seem that this case has strength-
ened Congress overall position in the foreign affairs power. On the other
hand, two caveats should be entered. First, it is possible in theory to
separate the effects of a presidential action in international affairs into
a domestic component and an external component. In such a case, it may
come about that the domestic effect of a presidential action will be
governed by the Youngstown formula while the foreign effect will be
governed by Curtiss-Wright. Congressional attempts to control the
President's use of military forces outside of the United States may
possibly be one such issue.74 Second, even under the Youngstown part of
the structure, Justice Rehnquist maintains that some actions of the
President are valid even in the face of explicit congressional disapproval
if Congress is constitutionally disabled from acting upon the subject at
all. For example, according to Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,"5 executive privilege is one
aspect of the separation of powers that would disable Congress from
acting in certain circumstances. Thus, while Justice Rehnquist has
begun to refine the Court's analysis of the foreign affairs power, many
issues remain to be elucidated.
74 See, e.g., Thomas & Thomas, Jr., Presidential War-Making Power: A
Political Question? 35 Sw. L.J. 879 (1981).
" 443 U.S. 425, 545 (1977).
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Applying the new structure to the instant case, we find that since
Justice Rehnquist has accepted the proposition that Congress does have
independent power to regulate claims settlements, we must conclude
that if the President had acted directly contrary to the will of Congress
in this area, Justice Rehnquist would have enforced the congressional
enactment.
VI. JURISDICTION VERSUS CAUSE OF ACTION
This brings us back to the most interesting part of the petitioner's argu-
ment and the Court's response. In fact, the petitioner in Dames &
Moore had asked the Court to face the issue of presidential action in the
face of congressional opposition. Petitioner asserted that the FSIA8 had
removed the President and the State Department from the adjudication
of claims against foreign states arising out of commercial dealings. By
suspending claims, the President was unilaterally divesting the federal
courts of their jurisdiction over the cases. Under article III, only Con-
gress can do that. Thus, the petitioner claimed, the President committed
two constitutional wrongs. He engaged in activities prohibited to him by
Congress, and at the same time he invaded Congress article III power to
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.77
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the FSIA differently. He read the ex-
ecutive order not as divesting the federal courts of their jurisdiction,
but of changing the substantive law under which the claims are adjudi-
cated."8 In removing the cases against Iran from the federal courts, the
President was not acting contrary to the FSIA. It is true that the FSIA
no longer permits a President to accord immunity to a foreign sovereign
vel non by mere fiat as he could previously. Now the courts determine
the applicability of immunity according to the standards written into
the Act. The FSIA removes one barrier to suit: sovereign immunity. The
statute, however, does not remove another barrier which may still be in-
stituted, namely, a settlement of the underlying cause of action."9 True,
under the settlement Iran is as free from domestic suit as it would be
under sovereign immunity. The result, however, derives from the exer-
cise of a different power, the one the Court found that Congress had
permitted.
The question as to whether the President altered the jurisdiction of
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
7 Brief for Petitioners at 9-16. Here Justice Rehnquist made an error in 'the
law. He wrote: "The FSIA granted personal and subject matter jurisdiction in
the federal courts over commercial suits brought by claimants against those
foreign states which have waived immunity." 453 U.S. at 684. In fact, a commer-
cial activity by a foreign state and voluntary waiver are separate bases for deny-
ing immunity. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976) (jurisdiction is invoked where
immunity is explicitly or implicitly waived), with id § 1605(a)(2) (commercial ac-
tivity automatically invokes jurisdiction).
78 453 U.S. at 685.
79 Id.
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the federal court or whether he is "directing the courts to apply a dif-
ferent rule of law" 80 is critical to the issues. If the President modified
the jurisdiction of the courts, the issues are: did he invade Congress jur-
isdiction granting power under article III; has he, by the same token, in-
vaded the judicial branch by taking away its jurisdiction; and concomi-
tantly, has he denied claimant's due process rights to access to an article
III court? On the other hand, if the President has changed the substan-
tive law governing the case, then the only issues are: did he have the
authority to effectuate such a change in the substantive law; and, was
there a taking of the plaintiff's property without just compensation?
Why is suspending the claims and transferring the cases to the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal not a change in jurisdiction? Substituting
one forum for another certainly seems to be a jurisdictional change. The
best way to understand the Court's point is to see the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal not as a "court" which has taken over the "juris-
diction" of the federal courts in these cases. Rather, the tribunal is more
closely akin to an agency empowered to distribute funds to claimants
upon the showing of entitlement as defined by the substantive rules
guiding the agency. Such commissions have existed, and although these
agencies were most often established by Congress, the Court still
regards those examples and the instant Claims Tribunal more as admin-
istrative agencies enforcing particular sets of rules than as different
courts. In fact, the Iran-United States Tribunal has a fund for distribu-
tion, and rules for determining entitlement and allocation. Furthermore,
the lower court is not divested of in personam jurisdiction by the
removal of Iran as defendant. Nor is it divested of subject matter
jurisdiction by giving another tribunal the power to adjudicate on the
underlying cause of action. Rather, the case is dismissed from the lower
federal court because there is no longer any claim upon which relief can
be granted."1 The claim has been settled by the President, not merely
"suspended" despite the infelicitous phrasing of the executive order.
The Tribunal "executes" the settlement by allocating the funds to
claimants who can prove their entitlement. If the claimant is held by the
Tribunal to have an entitlement or if he is held to have no entitlement,
that judgment is final and binding. On the other hand, if as a threshold
issue the claimant does not qualify to be heard by the Tribunal, his case
falls outside of the settlement and remains alive for federal court adjudi-
cations. The issue therefore refocuses the right of the President to ef-
fectuate a change in the substantive law of the claim by means of a set-
tlement, the issue which the Court disposed of above.
The petitioner's argument also falls for two other reasons. First, at
the same time that Congress was limiting the President's power to
8C I
81 Such was the opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in American Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981) cited in
Respondent's Brief at 54.
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grant sovereign immunity, it was also debating and rejecting limitations
on his power to reach settlements. The FSIA cannot therefore be regard-
ed as a congressional limitation on the settlement power.2 Secondly,
petitioner's argument suffers from an internal inconsistency. If, as peti-
tioner claims, the President's action in suspending claims is truly a
grant of sovereign immunity divesting the courts of jurisdiction con-
trary to article III of the Constitution, then every federal court which
permitted the President to impose sovereign immunity prior to the
FSIA was likewise tolerating an invasion of its article III jurisdiction.
Congress never believed presidential settlement to be an invasion of its
article III rights, and neither did the federal courts.
As Justice Rehnquist put it, "No one would suggest that a determina-
tion of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of 'jurisdiction.' "83
What was the legal effect then of past presidential orders shielding
foreign sovereigns from suit in United States courts? Sovereign immun-
ity was not, properly speaking, immunity from either in personam or
subject matter jurisdiction. The claimant's suit was dismissed for the
same reason that a final settlement is dispositive, namely, that there
was a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." As with
actual settlements with foreign powers, immunity goes to the substan-
tive law underlying the case. Until Congress exercised its foreign af-
fairs power in the FSIA, the President, with congressional acquiescence,
had exercised his article II diplomatic powers to effectuate a change in
the underlying cause of action. Thus, both the grants of sovereign im-
munity and claims settlement powers go to the President's ability to
regulate the substantive law in the foreign relations area subject to con-
gressional regulation. On the question of sovereign immunity, Congress
has chosen to regulate the area through the FSIA. On the question of
the definitive settlement of claims, Congress has chosen to leave the
President free.
82 453 U.S. at 686.
83 Id. at 685.
Justice Rehnquist expanded on the distinction between lack of jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Yazoo
County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, No. 80-1975, 50 U.S.L.W. 3545 (1982). There
he noted that Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), had created three tiers of federal
review in claims for recovery under the U.S. Constitution or federal laws. In the
first tier, where the claim was "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," it was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the second tier, where the
claim was "not wholly insubstantial and frivolous" but where the laws or the Con-
stitution provided no triable issue, the case could be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. At the third tier, the court may proceed
to the trial on the merits. 50 U.S.L.W. 3545.
Under this scheme the former presidential action in granting sovereign im-
munity and the continuing presidential power to settle claims fall into the second
tier. Such conclusion is also harmonious with Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure although Justice Rehnquist believes that Rule 12(b) contains only
the second and third tiers of the current interpretation of Bell v. Hood and that
Bell should accordingly be reexamined. 50 U.S.L.W. 3545-46.
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In one sense then, the petitioner was correct in asserting that the
claims settlement power is an end run around the restrictions of the
FSIA. The petitioner was in error, however, in terming both sovereign
immunity and claims settlement as acts supplanting federal court
jurisdiction. Both sovereign immunity and claims settlement are acts of
substantive lawmaking power, but there is a difference between the
two. A grant of sovereign immunity indefinitely suspends claims in
United States courts leaving a possible future settlement indeter-
minately up to the President and the foreign sovereign. A settlement of
claims is definitive of the rights of the parties and permanently removes
the claim from adjudication by United States courts (although distribu-
tion may be effectuated by governmental agencies). What Congress has
done, in effect, is to permit the President to avoid the limitations placed
on him by the FSIA through his retained capacity to settle claims
definitively. The claimant is no longer left in limbo as when sovereign
immunity was given by the President. Now, in a commercial case, his
claim is resolved either through judicial adjudication (via the FSIA), or
by settlement of the claim by the President.
That is why it is so vital to the case that President Reagan's "suspen-
sion" of the claims against Iran not be seen as indeterminative of the
rights of the parties. That kind of "suspension" is now governed by the
FSIA. The presidential action is a definitive settlement of claims with
Iran with the distribution of assets lodged with the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. As Justice Rehnquist put it: "[T]here does appear to
be a real 'settlement' here .... " The claims are "suspended" only in a
narrow sense of the word: If the Tribunal finds that the claim cannot be
definitively settled under its rules one way or the other, then the claim
can be "revived" in court in the United States. In fact, such a claim is
not really "revived." It has been found to have been outside the settle-
ment altogether and consequently the substantive law governing it has
not been changed by presidential order.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist spoke of the possibility that by means of
the suspension of claims, the government may have taken property for a
valid public purpose, but would still be obligated to provide compensa-
tion. Unlike previous settlements where claimants have traditionally re-
quested the government to espouse their claims, under the agreement
with Iran, the President settled the claims contrary to the wishes of
many of the claimants. The Court did not decide the merits of the taking
issue but held that the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction under
85 453 U.S. at 687 (contradicting the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Marshalk v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F.
Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981)).
In Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-2003 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 1982),
the court of appeals extended Justice Rehnquist's definition of "settlement" to in-
clude a suspension of claims where no recompense is provided. Persinger, a
former hostage, had contested President Carter's executive order forbidding any
claim against Iran "in any court within the United States or elsewhere" by any
person who had been held hostage by Iran. Id. slip op. at 5 n.5.
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the Tucker Act 8 to hear such a claim. 7
VII. CONCLUSION
In debates which preceded the Dames & Moore case, commentators
expressed the opinion that decades of progress towards resolving or-
dinary contract disputes with foreign states would be undone if the
Court acknowledged the right of the President to settle claims on his
own. The very large area of state relations with private parties would
be politicized once again, bringing new pressures on the State Depart-
ment, and causing greater friction with foreign states. At the same
time, there would be a halt in progress away from the old Vattelian88
system whereby the individual had no rights in international law, and
only states had legally cognizable existence. 9 On the other side, the
government feared that without the broadest discretion to operate in
the international sphere, the President would be incapable of peacefully
resolving a serious crisis like that with Iran.
Even though its decision was stated to be extremely narrow, the
Court not only avoided both problems, it helped forge tools for future
analysis of foreign policy disputes that will be of great utility. By deny-
ing that the President has plenary power to settle claims, the Court
avoided undermining the recent trend to depoliticize commercial rela-
tions between foreign states and private individuals. By pointing out
that claimants had opportunities to obtain satisfaction from the Claims
Tribunal, the Court noted that the reasonable expectations of private in-
dividuals in their dealing with foreign states were not dashed. In addi-
tion, by permitting suits to be brought before the Court of Claims on the
basis of the taking clause, the Supreme Court retained the vitality of
the Constitution's guarantees.
At the same time, by permitting the President to exercise claims set-
tlement powers with the acquiescence of Congress, if not its explicit ap-
proval, the Court allowed that department primarily in charge of the
conduct of foreign policy to resolve a complex, serious and delicate in-
ternational crisis. On the way to this result, Justice Rehnquist refined
the principles of Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown into a more mature
structure in which the roles and the relationships of the President, the
Congress, and the judiciary in foreign policy questions begin to be
delineated more clearly. He also took an additional step in dis-
tinguishing jurisdictional questions from those of substantive law. By
these mechanisms, the Court was able to harmonize all of these vital
values in a decision that will be of enduring benefit to the constitutional
order in this country.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. III 1979).
87 453 U.S. at 689.
88 Named after Emerich de Vattel whose famous treatise, LAW OF NATIONS
(1758), influenced international law for so long.
" See Transcript of a Conference on the Settlement with Iran, 13 LAW. AM. 1
(1981).
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